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ABSTRACT 
This inrroducrion firsr jusrifies [he uriliry of rhis special issue for English srudies and offers a brief 
overview of rhe srare of [he a n  in cognirive linguisrics. Ir rhen commenrs briefív on each of [he arricles in rhis 
collecrion, discussing rheir conrriburion ro each of rhe major rrends in [he field. and ro English srudies in 
general.. The conclusion highlighrs [he usefulness of rhis approach for a variery of concerns. 
KEYWORDS: Cognitive linguistics: overview; intellecrualroots, embodied meaning; merhodological principles: 
applicarions; editor's comments on essays. 
RESUMEN 
En esra inrroducción. en primer lugar, se jusrifica la urilidad del volumen para los esrud~os ingleses 
se hace una breve exposición del esrado acrual de la lingüísrica cogniriva. A conrinuación se comenra brevenienre 
cada arrículo, haciéndose hincapié en su aponación a cada uno de los principales secrores de la !ingiiísricn 
cogniriva v a los esrudios ingleses en general. Al final se desraca la indudable urilidad de esre enfoque pam una 
gran variedad de inrereses. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Lingüística cognitiva: visión general; raíces intelectuales; significado corporeizado: 
principios metodológicos; aplicaciones; comentarios del compilador sobre los diversos aniculos. 
1 .  AN OVERVIEW O F  COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 
1.1. Intellectual roots. Basic assurnptions. The discovery of ernbodied rneaning. 
'Cognitive linguistics' is the narne used for a particular approach to the study of 
language. It refers thus to a theoretical stance, to a general set of assurnptions about what 
language is, which are its foundations, how it is used, and which are the rnost adequate 
methodological principles to be observed in its study. 
1 shall be comrnenting on this set of assurnptions presently. But a few words rnay be 
necessary to justify the suitability of a rnonograph issue on cognitive linguistics for an 
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English studies joumal, like Cuadernos de Filología Inglesa. Most studies in cognitive 
linguistics have used English as the language of exemplification; in this respect the situarion 
is no different from that in GB (Chomsky's 'Governrnent and Binding') or other generative 
approaches. However, the fact is that cognitive linguistics still has a minority share in the 
various disciplines that make up the vast, manifold field of English studies. be it the study 
of al1 aspects of the English language, of the literatures in English, or of the cultures shaping 
and shaped by English: for al1 these broad areas of research and for their respective 
component disciplines, cognitive linguistics offers fascinating fresh approaches. new 
rnethodological principles, and many recent findings. 1 have no doubt, thus, that a large 
sector of the English studies community will welcome this collection of essays. 
We can now concentrate on the theoretical assumptions in our approach. The main 
cause for the emergence of what is now known as cognitive linguistics is to be found in [he 
dissatisfaction that a group of linguists experienced in the late seventies with the dominating 
generative paradigm in linguistics and in cognitive psychology (see Ruiz de Mendoza's 
interview with George Lakoff, this volume). This paradigm was felt to be excessively 
concemed with notational formalism at the expense of descriptive adequacy and psychological 
realism. On the other hand, some of the major assumptions underlying generative approaches 
to syntax and semantics (particularly the correspondence theory of tmth in semantics and the 
modularity hypothesis in linguistics and psychology) were clearly at odds with a growing 
mass of experimental data in linguistics, psychology and other fields, ando as Lakoff (1987) 
pointed out, with some brilliant pages in the philosophy of language (Austin and. rnost 
particularly. Wittgenstein). The 'rebels' (many of whom had initially worked within the 
generative approach) then embarked upon one of the most exciting intellectual adventures in 
linguistics in this century: they set out to revise most of the fundamental assumptions held 
for centuries about language and the foundations of language. The results of this scrutiny. 
very often carried out in various, though convergent, directions, have been impressive. Two 
fundamental tenets have emerged from this revision. 
The first one affects the very status of language as a human ability, which is now 
envisaged from a radically different perspective. Cognitive linguists do not regard the ability 
to learn one's mother tongue as a unique faculty, a special innate mental module, distinct 
from other general cognitive abilities. The modularity hypothesis is strongly advocated by 
generativist theorists (see e.g. Chomsky 1986: 18, Fodor 1983) and by other more or less 
faithful followers of Chomsky, including Jackendoff (see e.:. Jackendoff 1996:96) l .  
Research in anthropological linguistics (Berlin and Kay 1969, Kay 1975, Kay and McDaniel 
1978), cognitive psychology (e.g. HeiderZ 1971, 1972, Heider and Oliver 1972, Rosch 1973. 
1977, 1978, Rosch and Mervis 1975, Rosch 1983), in cultural anthropology (e.g. Berlin, 
Breedlove and Raven 1974, Kempton 1981, Holland and Qu im 1987), and, to a lesser 
extent, in neurology and neurophysiology (Damasio 1994, Edelman 1992), rather seerns to 
support a very different view. 
This view is that general cognitive abilities, like our kinaesthetic abilities, our visual 
or sensorimotor skills, and above all, our typically human categorisation strategies. especially 
our tendency to construct categories on the basis of prototypical basic-leve1 subcategories or 
exemplars (Neisser 1987, Rosch 1983, Tsohatzidis 19903) jointly account, together with 
cultural, contextual and functional pararneters, for the main design features of languages and 
for our ability to leam and use them. The keyword in this approach is embodimenr (Johnson 
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1987. Lakoff 1987, 1993a; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980 and their forthcorning book). Mental 
and linguistic categories cannot be abstract, disernbodied, hurnan-independent, categories. 
Quite the opposite: we construct and understand our categories on the basis of concrete 
experiences, and under the constraints imposed, first and forernost, by our bodies. Hurnan 
conceptual categories, the rneanings of  words and sentences, of linguistic structures at any 
leve], are not just a cornbination of a set of universal abstract features, of uninterpreted 
syrnbols. A very large nurnber of these rneanings and structures are more or less directly 
motivated by experience, in rnany cases, bodily experience4. 
SO concepts, including linguistic concepts, are grounded in experience (bodily .' 
physical experience, o r  social / cultural experience). This is thus in conflict with an axiorn 
in twentieth century linguistics: that of l'arbirraire du signd. The study of conceptual and 
linguistic grounding has advanced imrnensely in recent years, especially through the detailed 
investigation of bodily-based rnetaphorical systerns (see below), and through the investigation 
of the psychological reality (see Mandler 1992, Neisser 1987 and Gibbs 1995, Ch. 9) and 
the neural correlates of basic embodied concepts and of their extension to other concepts (for 
the neural correlates, see the early results of the Berkeley-based L-zero group as reported in 
Bailey (1997), Narayanan (1997), and Regier (1996)). This insistence on  ernbodirnent and 
rnotivation explains the irnportant role accorded to iconicity in language (Hairnan, 1985) 
This view of language as a product of general cognitive abilities is in fact a result of 
the observance of a yet more basic principle in cognitive linguistics, narnely, ~ t h e  cognitive 
commitment» (Lakoff 1990): linguistic theory and rnethodology rnust be consistent with what 
is empirically known about cognition, the brain, and language. Since ernpirical evidence 
(especially psychological and linguistic evidence) strongly favours the nonrnodularist 
hypothesis, rnost cognitive linguists adopt this hypothesis; but they would take a modularisr 
position if the bulk of evidence supported it. 
The second fundamental tenet is concerned with the theory of linguistic meaning. 
Most cognitive linguists clairn that rneanings do not 'exist' independently from the people that 
create and use thern, as Reddy brilliantly showed long ago in a now classic essay (Reddy 
1993 (1979)). Therefore they reject what both Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) have temed 
'objectivisrn' in linguistics and philosophy, since there is no objective reality which is 
independent frorn hurnan cognition. And linguistic forms, as Fillrnore, Lakoff, or Langacker 
say (see Ungerer and Schmid 1996:208-209) are just clues that activate the conceptual 
structures that we have formed in our rninds, but have no inherent rneanings in thernselves. 
Meanings 'reside' in our rninds and our brains (they can be characterised as neural routines). 
Linguistic forms just activate thern, but the (part of the) rneaning cornplex activated in rny 
rnind need not be exactly the same as the one activated in sorneone else's by an utterance 
with the sarne linguistic form, because, as was said earlier, meaning is a result of experience, 
both collective and individual. 
Meanings are not really inherent in linguistic forms, but they are conventionally 
paired, more or  less directly, to linguistic forms, which then become 'cues' for the activation 
of these rneanings. As Lakoff (1987: 583) puts it: 
The prirnary function of language is to convey rneaning. A gramrnar should therefore 
show as directly as possible how pararneters of form are linked to parameters of 
meaning. 
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This association is very often more or less directly motivated, as we said above. 
Therefore, the cognitive linguist tends to regard every distinction in form, no rnatter how 
small, as in principle being linked to a corresponding distinction in meaning (in a very broad 
sense of 'meaning'). This view is consistent with human rationality: why should linguistic 
cornmunities~develop these formal distinctions if not for the purpose of symbolising distinct 
(sometimes very subtle) meanings? To put it differently, a cognitive linguist is in principle 
inclined to be suspicious of claims of synonymy, or of paraphrase relations, which in our 
view can never be absolute (Taylor 1995:55-57), and to try and discover the qmbolic value 
of each linguistic form. 
1.2. Methodological principles 
These two theoretical standpoints have a number of irnportant consequences for 
linguistic rnethodology. The perception of our linguistic skills as a product of general 
cognitive abilities has brought about, on the methodological plane, the rejection of what has 
long been held as an archetypal 'scientific' requirement in linguistics, namely that al1 
linguistic analytical categories must impose necessary and sufficient conditions for 
membership in the category. Such a requirement entails, for instance, that there has to be one 
abstract, general definition (or a structural description) of passive clauses, which every 
seemingly passive clause conforms to. But such a definition is actually impossible to arrive 
at: no matter how sophisticated, it would always exclude sorne likely can di date^.^ Another 
consequence of this traditional requirement would be the need for positing general abstract 
meanings applicable to al1 the senses of polysemous lexical items. These senses would be 
regarded as related to this abstract, 'core' meaning. So the two different senses of eye in She 
has blue eyes and in The eye of the needle would be considered as related to one general, 
abstract sense of 'eye' (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: Ch. 18). The serious problem with this 
position is that in many cases, especially where the sense extension is due to metaphor or 
metonymy (see Sweetser 1986), it is virtually irnpossible to identify such an abstract sense, 
unless we (vacuously) state that this sense is 'circular shape'. How can then 'eye' be 
distinguished from 'wheel' or 'egg', or ... ? What is more, which is the abstract sense 
covering the senses of 'eye' in the two preceding examples and in He has a good eye for 
beauzy?. However, as we shall see presently, al1 of these senses are related, but not through 
an abstract default sense included in al1 of them. 
A cognitive linguistic methodology would take a very different path. One of the basic 
general cognitive abilities reflected in the stnicture and use of languages is protozype 
categorisation: human categories are normally characterised by having one typical member 
of a category (the prototype), to which other members are related in a motivated way, these 
less central members departing from the prototype in varying degrees and along various 
dimensions (see al1 the references above to the work by Rosch and others). A cognitive 
methodology would then identify the prototypical use of eye as that referring to a body-part, 
and would treat the other uses of this lexeme as motivated non-prototypical senses. related 
in a systematic way to the prototypical sense. In The eye of [he needle and in He has a good 
eye for beauzy the link is metaphorical; in other senses of 'eye' it may be metonymic. There 
would be no problem, then, in recognising the fact that the three senses illustrated by these 
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examples correspond to the same polysemous lexeme7. The study of polysemy and of the 
networks of senses in polysemous lexical items (and of gramatical const*ctions) thus 
becomes central in a cognitive approach8 and has been the subject of extensive high-quality 
research by cognitive linguists (see e.g., Sandra and Cuyckens, forthcoming). Of course this 
interest in sense networks or meaning chains is not incompatible with acknowledging the role 
of abstraction in the mental consuuction of prototypical senses.' 
Similarly, a cognitive grammarian would recognise a central type of passive 
consrrucrion (typically describing an action by a voluntary agent, with a dynamic transitive 
verb, an active correspondence, etc.) and a series (a network) of less central passive 
constructions motivated by the pr~totype'~.  An imponant point then is that there are seldom 
any necessary and sufficient conditions in human conceptual categories, including linguistic 
categories. 
A second consequence of the primacy of general cognitive abilities is that no strict 
distinction can be made between encyclopedic, experienced-based knowledge and linguistic 
meaning. This means that our large, complex conceptual structures are invoked in language 
use and comprehension, and that conventional meanings (i.e. strictly 'semantic' meanings) 
arise on the basis of experience and general knowledge. Hence the commonplace claim in 
cognitive linguistics that meaning is ultimately pragmatic, and very often holistic, gestalt-like. 
Such a claim is obviously at variance with the traditions in semantics underlying such 
constructs as Carnap's meaning postulates or Katz's semantic markers and distinguishers. 
And if experience-based knowledge permeates linguistic meaning at every level, these levels 
are themselves open-ended, there bekg no strict separation between them, especially between 
symbolic levels, i.e. between lexicon and grarnmar, or between levels in the organisation of 
meaning, i.e. semantics and pragmatics. Or between synchrony and diachrony. Functional 
and cognitive approaches to linguistic change have concluded that there is not a strict 
distinction between synchrony and diachrony since historical changes very often have the 
same social, functional and cognitive motivation which is directly observable in contemporary 
ongoing changes (especially in grammaticalization and lexicalization processes). 
This continuum between language and experience explains the fact that the study of 
conceptual srrucrures or cognitive models as reflected in language has been an important area 
of research in cognitive linguistics from its very beginning. Two complementary tendencies 
are Fillmore's frames (Fillmore 1975, 1976, 1982, 1985; Fillmore and Atkins 1992), and 
Lakoff's theory of idealised cognirive models (Lakoff 1982, 1987: 5-157). Cognitive models 
very often reflect culrural models (see below). 
A third consequence of this general theoretical position is the essential role of 
imaginarion, a basic human cognitive ability, normally despised in pretendedly 'scientific' 
theories of language. We humans 'make sense' of our less directly apprehensible experiences 
(for instance, of our experience of time, of emotions, or of human interaction), on the basis 
of more directly apprehensible and more easily describable experiences, which are usually 
bodily experiences. Thus we often project, for instance, part of our bodily experience of 
three-dimensional space onto our experience of time and talk about the future being «up». Or 
we map it onto our experience of happiness and talk about being in ahigh* spirits, or onto 
our experience of power and talk about having control qovern somebody (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980: 15-17). In so doing, we use our imagination. There are two basic imaginative cognitive 
mechanisms: meraphor and rnetonymy. They are not just rhetorical devices, not just a matter 
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of words. They are complex mental projections or mappings of our knowledge of one domain 
of experience to structure our knowledge of a different domain of experience, and they are 
normally carried out unconsciously and effortlessly. In metaphor we project (part of) of one 
conceptual domain onto another separate domain, e.g. the source domain of temperature onto 
the target domain of emotion, as in He tried to act cool. In metonymy the projection takes 
place within the same domain; an example is constituted by pars pro toro mappings, as in 
He won three golds, where the concept 'gold' stands for the concept 'gold medal' (example 
borrowed from Radden and Kovecses 1996). In many cases the more direct experiences 
mapped are themselves understood metaphorically or metonymically on the basis of image- 
schemas (Johnson 1987), which are preconceptual structures that we acquire as a result of 
our earliest bodily experiences (basic conceptual complexes like 'container', 'path' , 
'centreiperiphery', 'upidown'). Metaphor and metonymy determine a large part of lexical 
and grammatical meaning and form (Lakoff 1987:462-585, 1993b, Goldberg 1995, Sweetser 
1990: 49-149). The past few years have witnessed a steady effort aimed at describing the 
metaphorical systems in many languages, especially English," and at elucidating in greater 
detail the nature of metaphor, with important insights like the invariance principle (Lakoff 
and Turner, Lakoff 1990, 1993a, Jackel 1997, who criticises it), the phenomenon of duality 
and the 'inheritance hierarchies' in metaphor (Lakoff 1993a). 
Metonymy has received comparatively less attention than metaphor by cognitive 
linguists. However Lakoff and Johnson (1980: Ch. 8) and Lakoff (1987, especially Ch 5-8 
and case study 2), stress its importance in categorisation. Taylor (1995), and Fauconnier 
(1985, 1994) also devote particular attention to it. However some recent studies are 
begiming to fill this gap: Panther and Radden (forthcoming) will be a fundamental 
contribution; a particularly useful paper arnong those that will appear in this collection of 
essays is Radden and Kovecses 1997. An important area is the interaction between metaphor 
and metonymy (Goossens et al 1995, Barcelona, forthcoming a, b), especially the conceptual 
dependency of metaphor on metonymy (Barcelona, forthcoming b). 
Both metaphor and metonymy are viewed in cognitive linguistics as largely 
unconscious, automatic correspondences between experiential domains. A result of this 
conception is that the number of experiential domains which can be claimed to be understood 
on their own terms has been shown to be dramatically smaller than normally admitted by 
more traditional theories of categorisation and of metaphor and metonymy. For instance, 
apparently 'literal' expressions like He found the answer can be shown to be ultimately 
understood in terms of complex metaphorical models of ideas as objects and of understanding 
as vision, which also motivate a vast number of other linguistic expressions like e.g. 1 tried 
to convey the idea to you, or He has clear ideas. 
A recent tendency in cognitive linguistics which subsumes metaphor and metonymy 
as special cases of more general mental mapping mechanisms is the theory of 'blending' or 
conceptual integration, which is an extension of Gilles Fauconnier's earlier work on mental 
spaces (Fauconnier 1985, 1994) and has been developed by him and Mark Turner 
(Fauconnier, forthcoming, Fauconnier and Turner 1996, Turner and Fauconnier 1995). This 
new theory seems to explain how speakers and hearers keep tract of referential values and 
other factors in the conceptual mappings occurring throughout a discourse, often by 
constructing new, provisional conceptual domains or 'blends'. This work, and related work 
on recursive metaphorical chains (see, e.g. Rohrer, forthcoming), also seems to put in a new 
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perspective the common claim in cognitive metaphor theory that metaphorical mappings are 
unidirectional, i.e. that they move only from the source to the target domain, and points to 
the existence of multiple projections, though not in the way predicted by interactionalist 
theories of metaphor, like Black's (Black 1962). 
The emphasis upon the symbolic character of language (the second basic tenet 
discussed above) results in the methodological relevance given to detailed descriptions rather 
than to Post mles (mathematical formulae developed by Emil Post) or to other formal 
systems whose generative or predictive power has then to be constrained by artificial 'filters'. 
In generative approaches, it is these abstract, formal structures and mles that are supposed 
to be closer to psychological reality than the morphosyntactic configurations (constmctions) 
which are claimed to be their output, and which are regarded in these approaches as mere 
epiphenomena. By contrast, in cognitive linguistics the detailed analysis of grammarical 
consrrucrions as conventional pairings of form and meaning (including pragmatic meaning) 
becomes of prime interest (Fillmore 1988, Fillmore, Kay and O'Comor 1988, Goldberg 
1995 Lakoff 1987: 462-586, iangacker 1987, 1991). The same spirit is applied to the study 
of the lexicon, as we have seen, and to the study of phonology (Taylor: 222-239). 
Al1 of these methodological principles and the specific theories that they have brought 
about interact in various ways. The cognitive theories of conceptual structures (idealised 
cognitive models or ICMs, frames) and the lexical and grarnrnatical networks based on them 
assume, as basic mental mechanisms in concept formation and organisation, prototype 
categorisation and (especially in Lakoff's theory of ICMs) mapping mechanisms like 
metaphor, metonymy and mental spaces. In fact many cultural cognitive models are 
metaphorically structured (for two recent approaches see Palmer 1996 and Shore 1996). On 
the other hand, most conventional metaphors and metonymies, or the comection between two 
or more mental spaces, operate on the basis of the conventional 'frarne', 'ICM' (or part 
thereof) of the experiential domains connected. For instante, the metonymic mapping of the 
food consumed onto the customer which underlies expression like The cheeseburger has lefr 
wirhour paying works against the background of the conventional restaurant frame or ICM. 
If image-schemas are basic to cognition, they are doubtless instrumental in the construction 
of frames or ICMs and in metaphorical or metonymic mappings (Johnson 1987, iakoff 1990, 
1993a). Talmy (e.g. 1978, 1988, 1996) and Langacker (e.g. 1982, 1987, 1991, 1995) have 
produced extremely illuminating analyses of a vast array of grammatical phenomena 
understood on the basis of spatial image-schemas and the profiling or foregrounding of parts 
of them. l2 Construction grammars in general take into account image-schemas and conceptual 
mappingsL3as an essential ingredient in their description of the meaning and the form of many 
of these linguistic phenomena. Finally, Fillmore and Kay's Construction Grammar is 
designed specifically to interact with frame semantics (Valemela 1996). 
Of course, not everyone that can be regarded as a cognitive linguist necessarily agrees 
in every detail on al1 of these methodological principles. A good example might be Anna 
Wierzbicka, who despite her outspoken criticism of the cognitive theory of metaphor and 
metonymy (Wierzbicka 1986) and her mistrust of unwarranted prototype-based analyses 
(Wierzbicka 1990), can and should be regarded as a cognitive linguist because she professes 
the 'cognitive commitment' that characterises every cognitive linguist: in the absence of 
decisive evidence against her theory of universal semantic primitives, she has firmly 
maintained her leibnizian conception of linguistic meaning, and done extensive descriptive 
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research to support it. Another interesting example might be Langacker's postulation that 
speakers often use abstract schemas for many concepts altemating with prototype 
categorisation (Langacker 1987: 373ff). 
One of the criticisms sometimes levelled against cognitive linguistics, as contrasted 
with e.g. generative approaches, is that its 'rigour' suffers very much from its frank 
rejection of hitherto accepted formal notational systems. A cognitive linguist would reply that 
notation is just a shorthand for concepts and phenomena that have to be clearly understood 
first, and that generative theories have al1 too often used sophisticated mathematical 
machinery to represent ill-understood linguistic phenomena. Cognitive linguists prefer to 
understand linguistic facts in depth, i.e. both in their phenomenological and cognitive 
complexity and only then face the secondary problem of formal representation. By following 
this strategy, they have extended the range of linguistic phenomena for which realistic, usage- 
based descriptions and explanations are now possible, which may in turn lead to more 
accurate formal representations of some (but probably not all) aspects of language structure 
and use. 
1.3. Applications 
The irnmediately preceding paragraph takes us to the issue of applications. 1 shall 
mainly consider those directly comected with English studies. One of them has been a more 
realistic, thus more accurate descnption of large sectors of English grarnrnar and of its 
lexicon. Historical linguistics has been put in a new perspective, as we saw above. Another 
important application of cognitive linguistics has been its contnbution to a better 
understanding of the human mind, since language is one of our major windows into its 
workings, just as the study of mind has improved our understanding of language (Lakoff 
1987, Gibbs 1995, Lakoff and Johnson, forthcoming). A similar case of cross-fertilisation 
in recent years has been the relation between cognitive linguistics and the scientific study of 
cultural models, normally carried out by sociologists and anthropologists (e.g. see the 
references above to Holland and Quinn, Palmer, Shore, and those in Martín Morillas's paper 
in this volume). 
The application to and cooperation with artificial intelligence has already yielded some 
important results, in particular computational implementations of some cognitive theories 
(e.g. Martin 1989)14 and connectionist studies of some image-schematic and metaphorical 
conceptualisations (e.g. Bamden 1991-94 or the results of the Berkeley L-zero group quoted 
above). We could also add interesting cases like the Cog project at MIT, whose team is 
building a robot with 'embodied' artificial intelligence (Brooks and Stein 1993). Al1 of this 
experimental, 'high-tech' research has taken seriously Lakoff and Johnson's claims about 
embodied cognition. 
Cognitive linguistics in general has been instrumental in renewing lexicology 
(Geeraerts, Grondelaers and Bakema, 1994) and lexicography (Geeraerts 1990, 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1990). Frame semantics in particular has been shown to have 
important computational lexicographic applications (Fillrnore and Atkins 1994, Lowe, Baker 
and Fillmore 199715). Cognitive linguistics has led to a better understanding of first language 
learning processes (see e.g., Bowerman 1997). And though little has been done yet in this 
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direction, there is no doubt that cognitive linguistics can also contribute usefully to second 
language learning research (see e.g. Correa 1989) and that language teaching methodology 
will benefit by contact with cognitive approaches (Ungerer and Schrnid 1996:267-274): there 
is today a serious interest in pursuing this line of research.16 
The study of literature and other art forms has benefited enormously by the cognitive 
theories of metaphor and metonymy and has been shown to be extremely useful as a window 
into human cognition (see e.g. Hiraga and Radwhka-Williams 1995, Lakoff and Turner 
1989, Turner 1987, 1991, 1996). 
Even such fields as the study of politics (Lakoff 1992, 1996), ethics (Johnson 1993), 
law (Winter 1989), science (Boyd 1993), religionI7, philosophy (iakoff and Johnson. 
forthcoming), and many others have benefited from the methodology developed in cognitive 
linguistics, most particularly, for the study of metaphor and cognitive models. 
This brief review of the main tenets, themes, methodological principies and 
applications of cognitive linguistics is by no means exhaustive. There are many other 
important aspects in our approach that 1 have not been able to mention, but 1 hope that the 
preceding pages will have been sufficiently informative for interested members of the English 
studies community, as a general account of this recent tendency in linguistics. 
11. THE ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME 
The articles in the present volume constitute a fair representation of the trends in 
cognitive linguistics discussed above. 1 would like to stress the fact that the large number of 
articles included is a consequence of the massive response that our cal1 for papers received 
from various parts of the world, though most of the contributions are from scholars working 
in Spain. Most of the conuibutions received were high-quality ones and most of those that 
were rejected were turned down simply because their topics lay outside the scope of this 
volume. This large collection of papers is thus evidence both of the ever growing relevante 
of cognitive linguistics for English studies and of its vitality in Spain. 
The classification of the papers, which is reflected in their serial arrangement in the 
volume, is not meant to be absolutely accurate, since a substantial part of them could have 
been placed in more than one group. It simply tries to highlight the main focus of each 
paper, in the editor's view. 
11.1. The interview with George iakoff 
The interview with George Lakoff done by Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza wonderfully 
sets the scene for the rest of the volume. This is the reason why it appears right after this 
editorial article. It elaborates on many of the topics discussed here and in the papers, and 
it touches on many other themes with George's characteristic brilliance, sparked off by the 
interviewer's intelligent, incisive questionnaire. It is also a fascinating narrative, by one of 
the leading figures in cognitive linguistics, about the socioacademic and intellectual origins 
and vicissitudes of the cognitive movement. 
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11.2. Conceptual structures 
The first group of papers deals with what we have genericaIly called above conceptual 
structures, Le., cognitive models in general, cultural models, schemas, frarnes, etc. The 
article by José Manuel Martín Morillas is a bright, stimulating presentation of what he calls 
the 'cognitive-cultural model' (C-CM), a complex, many-sided conceptual structure that 
packages and schematises a rich mass of socially shared information and knowledpe about 
a field of experience. The meanings of words are to be interpreted as relevant to such a 
model. Martín Morillas illustrates his presentation with an outline of the C-CM of the 
categories World and Self. The papers by Celia Wallhead and Encarnación Hidalgo 
investigate the functioning of conceptual structures in the creation and reception of the 
literary work. Wallhead's article analyses how Salman Rushdie re-tells the story of the 
relationship between Columbus and Queen Isabella of Spain, fust by triggering up in the 
reader the conventional cultural models or schemas that would fit the historian's account of 
the facts, and by later destroying them by means of the intrusion of other conventional 
schemas, which leads to the construction of new, unconventional schemas ('schema 
refreshrnent'). Hidalgo's essay applies a reinterpretation of Alan Garnharn's theory of mental 
models which takes into account Quinn and Holland's notion of cultural models, to explain 
the rejection of Synge's The Playboy of the Westem World by conservative Irish audiences 
at the beginning of the 20th century, as a clash between conflicting mental models. 
11.3. Polysemy and semantic change 
The second group of papers is concerned with various aspects of lexical and 
grarnrnatical semantic change in polysemous structures, in a cognitive linguistic framework. 
Iraide Ibarreche studies the cross-linguistic regularities in the metaphorical extensions of the 
perception sense of verbs of smelling into mental or emotional domains like 'liking', 
'suspecting', 'guessing', etc. in English, Basque and Spanish. Her results challenge 
Sweetser's claim that what Kovecses (1995) would cal1 the metaphorical scope of this 
perception domain is weaker than that of others like sight or hearing. Enrique Palancar's 
excellent, carefully documented paper traces the emergence of the agentive sense of by in 
passive clauses as an extension from the instrumental sense present in the initial radial 
semantic network of the preposition. This claim disproves Langacker's earlier proposal, 
which had skipped the instrumental link. 
11.4. Metaphor and metonymy 
The third set of contributions, by far the largest one, is devoted to various aspects of 
the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy and its applications. Two of these papers 
study theoretical issues. Judith Ferenczy applies the cognitive theory of metaphor to study 
the systematic networks of conventional metaphors (%meta-metaphorsm) employed in three 
well-known theories of metaphor, including Lakoff and Johnson's. The revealing result is 
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that the metalanguage employed by an interactionalist like Black and a pragmatist like Searle 
is shown to be itself evidence of the correctness of the cognitive theory of metaphor! 
Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza discusses brillliantly some nuclear areas of the theory of 
metonymy: he demonstrates convincingly that metonymy is not crucially differentiated from 
metaphor in 'terms of 'domain highlighting' vs. 'domain mapping' (as Croft claims); he 
explores some previously unnoticed similarities between metaphor and metonymy that seem 
to point to a continuum between both mechanisms; he offers some evidence that metonymy 
is not distinguished from other cases of polysemy in terms of intrinsicness (as Croft asserts), 
but in terms of centrality of mappings, and finally argues for the complementarity of the 
cognitive theory of metonymy with relevance theory. 
Four papers in this group are case-studies of particular metaphors or specific 
metaphorically-structured conceptual domains. Valentina Apresjan, in her highly suggestive 
article, attempts to explain the cross-linguistic recurrente of a certain set of emotion 
metaphors on the basis of the type of source domains, i.e. physiological, cultural, or 
'cognitive', and suppons her proposal with a vast array of examples drawn from English and 
Russian. Laurence Erussard applies cognitive metaphor to the study of St Matthew's passage 
<<you are the salt of the earthn. It is an exercise both in cultural and religious history and in 
cognitive semantics that brings together the full complexity of the cultural ingredients that 
must have come into play in the understanding of this passage by Jesus' contemporaries and 
near contemporaries, the universal and persistent bodily motivation of the basic gustative 
metaphor having been kept intact through time. John Newman's paper is an insightful, 
carefully documented case study of the metaphorical scope of the prototypical conceptual 
domains of eating and drinking in English, which he shows to be mapped onto domains as 
diverse as breathing, the mind, ideas, life, possessing, physical destruction, and others. 
Michael Whire shows how a small set of metaphors, with just two general source schemas 
(the weather and living organisms), are recurrently used by three very different British 
newspapers in their reponing of a currency crisis in the European Monetary System. It is 
also an interesting analysis of the cohesive role of cenain pivotal metaphors in discourse, 
which is hardly surprising, given the fact that metaphors often structure the reasoning 
processes materialising in discourse (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
The last two papers in the group study the function of c o g ~ t i v e  metaphor in literature. 
Pilar Alonso offers a penetrating analysis of Lakoff and Turner's proposals for the 
metaphorical analysis and interpretation of literary texts, warning us about the danger of 
global interpretations whose justification rests solely on an appeal to the system of 
conventional metaphors in the language in question, without due consideration given to 
context, macrostructural formal text structure, and microstructural co-text. In her paper, 
Lorena Pérez Hemández makes explicit the ultimately spatial, irnage-schematic basis of 
George Lakoff' S theory of the metaphorical conceptualisation of the self, by analysing it 
systematically in terms of Mark Johnson's spatial image-schemas. This enriched version of 
Lakoff's theory is then used as a tool for showing how spatial metaphors guide the writer's 
construction of character and how it can guide a plausible interpretation of the meaning of 
the novel: the behaviour and language of each of the three protago~sts are claimed to be 
somehow 'diagrammatic' with respect to each of the metaphorical constituents of the self, 
and the novel can be read symbolically as the story, not of three people, but of one 
disintegrated person. 
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11.5. Grammar and phonology 
The fourth group of papers is concerned with grammar and phonology, i.e. with 
linguistic foirn. Palancar's paper could also have been included in this group, too, but his 
essay is more directly devoted to the semantics of a gramatical lexeme ('by'). If, as we 
said in our overview of cognitive linguistics earlier in this article, the main principle in 
cognitive linguistics is the cognitive commitment, then a cognitively adequate gramatical 
theory has to be psychologically adequate. In his article, Javier Martín Arista explores the 
psychological adequacy of Givon's Functional Typological Grammar (FTG). He elaborates 
a number of adequacy criteria on the basis of Givon's own principles and of those of another 
two functionalist schools (Dik's Functional Grammar and Halliday's Systemic Functional 
Grammar) as a gauge to evaluate the psychological adequacy of FTG. It is claimed that this 
theory satisfies most of the criteria, thus qualifying as a cognitive theory, but its bottom-up 
orientation flouts the 'processing adequacy meta-criterion' , and its maintenance of tree- 
diagram, phrase-structures and transformations seems inconsistent with the emphasis on 
constructions in most cognitive theories. 
Joseph Hilfeny applies Goldberg's version of construction grammar to explain the 
incorrectness of a cornrnon assumption in some pedagogical grammars, namely that been is 
a past participle of go in expressions such as I have been to Paris. He examines the kinds 
of constructions go enters into to refute this wrong assumption by showing that been is not 
an allomorphic variant of gone, but been to is a special idiomatic construction, with its own 
syntax and semantics. The brief but insightful paper by Javier Valenzuela and Joseph Hilfeq 
challenges Michaelis and Larnbrecht's clairn that it in what they cal1 nominal extraposition 
(as in Ir's amazing, the claims they make) is devoid of meaning because it is not coreferential 
with the head (claims) of the extraposed NP. Showing first that coreferentiality is independent 
from gramatical  concord, they argue persuasively that ir cataphorically refers to the scene 
or frame evoked by the extraposed NP. This analysis is more congenia1 with the cognitive 
linguistic maxim that form is in principle semantically motivated. 
Juana Man'n Arrese's very well-documented, carefully argued article unveils the 
systematic connection of a series of marked, non-prototypical morphosyntactic constructions 
in English and Spanish (some be- and ger- passives, motion adverb constructions, Spanish 
se, etc.), to our conceptualisation of events. On the basis of Croft's accounts of the 
prototypical event, of natural event chains, and of the natural profiling of aspects of events 
as coded by verbs, she studies marked constructions in the area of transitivity and voice as 
syncretisms of various kinds of deviation from the natural profilings or construals of events, 
and displays their intercomections at three levels on a synoptic semantic space chart, which 
is also an image of the extensional pathways followed in the appearance of these syncretisms. 
Finally Javier Díez Vera attempts to provide a partial explanation for one of the sound 
changes that made up the Great Vowel Shift (the raising of ME long a)  in approximate 
cognitive terms. His detailed study suggests that the change carne about partly as the result 
of a cognitive process triggered off in listeners by the misunderstandings due to cross- 
dialectal communication in 16th century London. 
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11.6. Foreign language learning 
The last two anicles in the volume exemplify the value of a cognitive perspective in 
attempts at explaining processes in foreign language learning. Both papers adopt a cognitive 
perspective in a broad sense. The paper by Piedad Fernández and Flor Mena studies the role 
of the inference of the meaning of unfamiliar lexemes in the comprehension of texts by 
learners of English as a second (and as a foreign) language. This inference is shown to be 
facilitated by the prior acquisition of the related conceptual structures, the accuracy rate of 
[he reader's 'guesses' being dramatically heightened as a result. Some pedagogical guidelines 
are suggested on the basis of these observations. The article by Ana Rojo interprets the 
results of her own experirnent with a set of British speakers learning four Spanish 
conjunctions, in terms of Bialystock's 'processing-continuum model', which emphasises the 
role of automatization (which she claims to be parallel to Langacker's notion of 
'entrenchment') in foreign language learning. Although some of the predictions of the model 
about variability in task performance are not confirmed by the experiment, her conclusions 
confirm the validity of most of Bialystock's claims. 
NOTES 
' A brief exchange of views berween [he generative (Victoria Fromkin) and the cognitive (Timo Haukioja) 
camps was published in Cognitive Linguistics 4-4: 395-407. 
' Eleanor Heider began publishing under the name Eleanor Rosch after 1973. 
' Tsoharzidis (1990) is an interesting collection of essays with various views on the vaiue of protorype rheory 
for semantics. 
' We would want to hypothesize, in fact, that the conventionai meaning of most morphemes, words, and 
synractic stmctures was panly morivated and not wholly a r b i t r q ,  at least in their genesis as symbolic stmcrures 
ar some stage in the development of a given language or of its parent languages (see Heine 1993, who proposes 
rhree basic bodily-spatial semantic schemas as the motivation for grarnmatical categories; see aiso Goldberg 
1995). According to Lakoff (1990, 1993a). most (if not ail) basic abstract concepts, such as causarion or time, 
or quantity (which underlie the meanings and the form of many linguistic structures) originate (via meraphor) 
in our bodily experience of spatial relations. This is, of course, a radical version of the embodiment claim. But 
mosr cognitive linguists agree that our bodily experience plays a major motivating role in the semantic and 
synractic structures of languages. 
Of course this is not to say that total motivation is the rule in linguistic fonns or meanings. In many cases, in 
facr, rhe motivation is no longer apparenr ro rhe mtive speaker. Just think of rhe word sad: there appears to be 
no apparenr motivation for its present meming. But historical research may discover this motivation: in rhis 
case, the emotioml meaning is a metaphorical enension from an earlier bodily meaning ('sared', @ll ' ) ,  on 
the barir of a basic metaphor that regards rhe person as a container for emotions (Barceiom 1986, Kovecses 
1990). 
Which syntactic or semantic propenies do sentences like 'Cash has been replaced by credit', 'Cash har been 
replaced with credit', 'The computer was smarhed by Mike' and '1 am very surprised to see you' have in 
comrnon? Every experienced gramrnarian knows their syntactic propenies (including their potentiality for active 
counterpans) are very different, not to mention their semantic ones. Saying that ail passives are characterized 
by containing a be+pasr paniciple group will not do, because the third sentence can (more accurately) be 
described as containing be and an adjective phrare (notice the presence of very, which is a typical modifier of 
adjectives and adverbs). 
' 1 ams using the term 'lexeme' in much the same way as Lyons (1977: 19, passim) i.e. as an abstract label 
for al1 the forms of a lexicai item. But, if 1 understood properly Lyons's version of lexicai field theory (of 
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which he is a well-known exponent), he would regad related but different senses of the same lexical irem as 
belonging to different lexemes, which would be included in different lexical fields. In my usage of the term 
'lexeme' al1 the (related) senses of the same lexical item are also part of the same lexeme. So in my usage of 
rhis technical tenn, 'eye' is a lexeme whose (written) f o m  can be eye, eyes and in rare cases eye S or eyes', 
whose spoken f o m  are /ai/ or /aiz/, and which has a number of related senses (and morphosyntactic 
propenies; just think of the verb '(10) eye'), most of which are normally listed by dictionaries. 
See e.g, Bnigman (1988), Herskovits (1986). Langacker and Casad (1985), and Vandeloise (1991), on the 
polsysemy of prepositions, and the snidies on the metaphorical polysemy of emotional t e m  by Kovecses (1986, 
1988. 1990). and on that of modal verbs by Sweetser (1990:ch 3). An early attempt at characterizing lexical 
nerwork analyses was Lakoff and Norvig (1987). 
See Langacker's speculation on the possible constmction of a prototype sense for 'tree' (Langacker 1987. 
373ff). 
!O These less central constmctions being funhennore systematically related to prototypical transitive clauses 
iwhich themselves have prototype stmcture) and to prototypical natural event clases and event constmals. See 
Marin Arrese's illuminating discussion in this volume. 
" As an example of the growing interest in metaphor by Anglicists we may quote Kovecses (1986, 1988, 1990). 
Turner (1987. 1991, 1996), Lakoff and Turner (1989), collection of essays like Hiraga and Ranwanska- 
Williams (1995), or the two recent, highly successful seminars organized last September as part of the 4th 
Conference of the European Society for the Study of English (ESSE), held at Debrecen (Hungary): ~ T h e  
CognitiveTheory of Meraphor and Metonymy: State of the An and Applications to English Studies., organized 
by Anronio Barcelona, with eleven participants among them Margaret Freeman, 201th Kovecses, or Günter 
Radden; a brief repon on the Seminar is shonly to appear in The English Messenger, ESSE's newsletter. The 
other seminar was .Cognitive Stylistics~, organized by Peter Verdonck, with some imponant studies of 
metaphor (especially by Donald Freeman and Peter Stockwell). 
" The spatial semantic configurations claimed by Talmy and Langacker to be at the core of grammatical 
meaning and form are similar to [he image-schemas of Johnson 1987 and Lakoff 1987. which were in fact 
inspired by them, especially by Langacker's work: both use typical 'langackerian' notions like trajector and 
landmark. But the image schemas of Johnson or Lakoff are cognitively fundamental pre-conceptual abstractions 
from everyday experience. These are often elaborated or combined in Langacker's (or Talmy's) configurations 
(e.g. the 'force' image schema merges with the 'source-path-goal' image schema in the conception of an 'action 
chain', which is basic for describing numerous aspects of clause stmcture in Langacker 1991:283). Thus, as 
Langacker says (ibid., 399). ~image schemas play an imponant role in stmcturing cognitive domains (such as 
the canonical event model) that suppon the characterizattion of basic grammatical constmcts.. 
I 3  Langacker has paid little attention to the metaphorical nature of grammatical categories, but.he cenainly 
acknowledges explicitly that many of the cognitive domains invoked by his 'predications' (his semantic 
description of expressions) are metaphorically stmctured (Langacker 1991:8) and has sometimes pointed out 
possible cases of the metaphorical extension of grammatical constmcts (1991:274-276, 309-310. 399). But he 
has paid special attention to the use of metaphor by linguistic theories ( 1  987:452ff; 1991 :507-5 10). On the other 
hand, he has studied in detail a number of metonymic grammatical phenomena, like 'reference-point 
constmctions' (ibid.: 351; 1993) or his 'active zones' (1987: 271, 1991: 453-457). The central role of 
conceptual mapping in grammar has recently been demonstrated by F a u c o ~ i e r  and Turner 1996, and by the 
essays in F a u c o ~ i e r  and Sweetser 1996. 
'' David M Powers organized a theme session during the latest Intemational Cognitive Linguistics Conference 
(ICLC) called 'Computer Models in Cognitive Linguistics' . The papers presented in it will probably be made 
available electronically from the organizer (powersQist.flinders.edu.au). 
I j  The Framenet project by Fillmore and his collaborators is at an advanced stage. For information visit its 
homepage in WWW (http://www .icsi.berkeley .edu/ - framenet/index.html). 
I d  Susan Niemeier and Rene Dirven organized a theme session on this subject at ICLC last July, and she intends 
to set up an international network of researchers in the field. 
" See the symposium organized last April at Duisbug by René Dirven and Ralph Bisschops on metaphor and 
religion, with numerous papers by cognitive linguists and theologians sympathetic with this approach. The 
papers will be published in three volumes. Initial versions have been published by L.A.U.D. (Linguistic Agency 
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of rhe üniversity of Duisburg). 
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